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Abstract—Integrated Circuit Metrics (ICmetrics) technology 
is concerned with the extraction of measurable features of an 
embedded system, capable of uniquely identifying the system’s 
behaviour. Any changes in these identifiers (profiles) during 
consequent devices’ operation would signal about a possible 
safety or security breach within the electronic system. This paper 
explores the combination of program counter (PC) and Cycles 
per Instructions (CPI) of a processor core as a potential 
ICmetrics source for embedded system security. The use of this 
combination exhibits that while isolated PC values may not 
always generate a stable identifier (profile) for a device that 
would distinguish the device from the rest in a considered set, the 
PC and CPI sequences and frequencies in the execution flow may 
serve as suitable ICmetrics features. 
Keywords—ICmetrics; embedded system security; program 
counter; Cycles per Instructions; 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
ICmetrics (Integrated Circuit metrics) is a technology that 
can generate unique identifiers from the distinctive 
characteristics of the software and hardware associated with a 
particular electronic device [1]. Based on internal and external 
sensors, electronic devices sense different environmental 
condition, trigger the execution of different software, perform 
different tasks and even interact differently with different users. 
Various features can be extracted from digital devices' 
operation that may be integrated together to generate unique 
identifiers for each of the devices or create unique profiles that 
describe the devices' actual behaviour. The generated 
identifiers can then be used to create encryption keys for 
embedded devices enabling secure encrypted communication. 
This technology does not only ensure secure data storage and 
transmission, but also helps to detect failure, tampering and 
malicious exploitation of electronic devices [2]. 
Similar to features (biometrics) that is closely linked or can 
be characterized any particular human being, be it Iris, DNA or 
fingerprint; ICmetrics is the device equivalent for 
characterizing an electronic device. Compared to other popular 
techniques for electronic system, such as the Physical 
Unclonable Functions (PUF) technologies [3], hardware 
intrinsic security [4], biometrics [5], encryption and password 
[6], the ICmetrics technology can be considered as a hybrid 
approach as it exploits features derived which are extracted 
based on the interaction of the hardware with their users and/or 
environment. 
In the previous works [7] and [8], the authors aimed to 
explore the possibility of applying the ICmetrics technology to 
generate stable encryption keys based on characteristics 
derived from embedded systems’ operation. The program 
counter (PC) of a processor core was used as a source for 
ICmetrics features, where full PC profiles were analysed to 
find the distinct values from different programs. Kovalchuk et. 
al. [9] presents some interesting properties of a processor that 
can be used as ICmetrics. They explored samples of PC and 
used it as ICmetric to determine the effects on systems stability 
and performance. The number of occurrence of a particular PC 
value is used to address how different applications utilize the 
memory space. Their result shows that there are certain areas in 
the memory space, occupied by a single application.  
Similar to [9], Kovalchuk et. al. [8] identified the PC as a 
potential ICmetric. The paper focused on possibilities of 
extracting the PC values with little or no effect on the actual 
program execution. They also suggested the PC may hold 
interesting features to complement other parameters for a 
robust ICmetric. Test conducted shows some level of identity 
between simple programs in terms of sequence and frequency 
of the PC values. Another interesting observation from the 
paper is the fact that PC values remain the same for a particular 
application when extracted by single stepping or sampling 
tracing. 
Reiss and Renieris [10] present a means of visualizing and 
understanding the dynamic behaviour of large complex 
systems using data collected as the program runs. They first 
select subsets of the raw tracing data, which is normally 
voluminous and then apply run-length encoding in an attempt 
to infer its structure. Gniady et. al. [11] explores the viability of 
applying program counter-based prediction techniques to 
optimize buffer caching. Their technique allows the operating 
system to correlate the input and output operations with the 
program context in which they are triggered. This paper 
explores the combination of PC and Cycles per Instructions 
(CPI) as a potential source of ICmetric features. The paper is 
organised as follows. Section II gives an overview of the 
ICmetric technology, followed by sections III and IV with 
detailed properties exhibited by the PC and CPI respectively. 
Section V, concludes with the potentials of combining PC and 
CPI as an ICmetric feature, with future directions. 
II. ICMETRICS TECHNOLOGY BASED EMBEDDED SYSTEM 
SECURITY SOLUTION 
The ICmetrics technology is mainly based on measurement 
of potential features that are derived from characteristics of an 
embedded system under different circumstances. By analysing 
and employing the features, a unique identifier can be 
generated and used to describe or determine the embedded 
system. Typically, the circumstances of an embedded system 
can change by running different software or interacting with 
different users.  
In order to calibrate an embedded system for a specific 
circumstance, a calibration phases is applied once while an 
application is running for the first time, where the features of 
this application are extracted and recorded by the ICmetrics. 
Those recorded unique features can then be integrated as a 
unique identifier for the purpose of encryption. In this case, 
while different applications or circumstances are employed in 
this embedded system, the different features should then be 
generated, which means based on these new features, a distinct 
encryption key should be finally created. As the keys are 
mismatched, the system will stop working to protect the user 
data. Based on the above idea, two phases of the ICmetrics 
system are required: 1) calibration phase, where features and 
characteristics of an embedded system are recoded and 
analysed. 2) Operational phase, where unique identifier is 
generated for the key generation.  
The overall ICmetrics technology based embedded system 
diagram is shown below in Fig. 1. 
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Fig. 1. A block diagram of a typical ICmetrics based embedded system. 
In the current ICmetrics based embedded system, 
identifying the devices’ characteristics  and generating suitable 
features for the ICmetrics system are the main challenges in 
this domain [7]. The suitable features must represent the 
characteristics of the embedded system, and the feature 
extraction and analysing processes should not significantly 
affect the performance of the embedded system. Considering 
the above two points, the PC and CPI are introduced as 
possible ICmetrics features in the following sections. 
III. PROPOTIES OF PC 
Depending on the platform and size of memory used, the 
PC values of a program can be logged during its execution. The 
PC values can also be significantly huge. A typical execution 
of the angle conversion program [8] on an ARM9 Cortex - M3 
processor can have PC values ranging from 134218632 to 
134223590, using an intrusive tracing method. For a single 
execution, the PC profile of an application can range from ten 
to hundred thousand in a second. The profile also exhibits 
some characteristics distinct to the very application in 
execution. The features may be more dominant over time or 
space; access to specific memory location. The spatial and 
temporal features exhibited by four algorithms chosen from the 
automotive package of the MiBench suite of benchmark 
algorithms [8], namely: angle conversion (AC); bit count (BC); 
cubic function (CF); and square roots (SR) are shown in figures 
2 and 3.  
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Fig. 2. Spartial PC distribution for the four different applications. 
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Fig. 3. Temporal PC distribution for the four different applications. 
The spatial distribution shows how similar application may 
have common PC values. The only distinguishing feature is the 
frequency of use of a particular address space, which can only 
be estimated after the program, has run to completion. In the 
contrary, the temporal distribution shows the pattern of use of 
address space over a period of time, and can further be refined 
to generate ICmetric features during the program execution. 
IV. PROPOTIES OF CPI 
In embedded system, processing throughput is one aspect 
of a processor’s important parameter. Typically, CPI or its 
multiplicative inverse of Instructions per Cycle (IPC) is used to 
represent a processor’s performance [12]. Most computers or 
embedded systems run synchronously at a constant clock rate, 
the CPU clock rate depends on the specific CPU architecture 
and its hardware implementation technology used. A program 
is comprised of a number of micro operations which depend on 
the instruction sets and the exact CPU architecture that are used 
in the embedded system. For example, the well-known CPU 
design strategy: Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RISC) 
normally has 5 stages: 
Instruction 
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Fig. 4. A block diagram of a typical RISC processing steps. 
In Fig. 4, each stage needs one clock cycle for passing an 
instruction through the stages sequentially. The number of 
CPU clock cycles for each instruction varies in the used 
hardware architectures. For example, without pipeline strategy, 
a new instruction is fetched in the first stage at least 5 clock 
cycles, but a new instruction may be fetched every cycle if the 
pipeline strategy is used. In addition, some of instructions 
require multi-cycle to be executed as they need access to 
memory during the processing (e.g. Load, Store and Jump). 
Therefore, the number of CPU cycles needed for a single 
instruction to be executed in a computer system is termed as 
CPI. A program normally consists of varying instructions, 
which means the program should have varying CPI values 
during execution. Thus, average CPI value that can be used to 
describe the system performance varies in a specified period of 
execution. The average CPI of an embedded processor can be 
calculated as given in (1) [13]: 
maxT fCPI
I

    (1) 
  
where I is the total number of instructions, T is time 
consumption while executing the total number of instructions, 
and maxf is the maximum clock frequency of an embedded 
processor.  
Although PC can exhibit some properties of a program, a 
large number of data need to be processed for the feature 
extraction. In this case, if all the PC data are analysed, the 
system performance may degrade. Therefore, according to the 
discussion of the CPI properties, CPI can be an alternative 
feature for the ICmetrics system.  
Fig. 5 shows an example of PC and CPI diagrams of a 
program executed in ARM based embedded system. 
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Fig. 5. Example of PC and CPI diagrams. (a) PC. (b) CPI. 
In Fig. 5, each point on graph (a) represents an executed PC 
value, and each point on graph (b) represents average CPI 
value taken over every 10,000 instructions executed. From the 
point of view of processing data volume, (using the two 
graphs), the CPI graph only contains 0.01% data volume of the 
PC graph. This could significantly reduce the processing time 
for the analysis of ICmetrics features. From the point of view 
of feature extraction, although the CPI graph has much less 
information compare to the PC graph, the main features of the 
executed program is remained. For example, the peaks PC 
values normally indicate where the branch jump instructions 
occur, which means certain function or condition are called or 
triggered. Therefore, it is possible to obtain enough information 
to identify the executed program from these points. As can be 
seen from Fig.5 (b), the CPI graph still remains the main 
characteristics of the program, especially, the relationship of 
these peaks are retained. 
In Fig.5 (b), every single average CPI value is taken over 
every 10,000 instructions per interval. However, this interval 
number can be chosen differently. If fewer instructions are 
taken, more details of the program can be obtained. Fig. 6 
illustrates several average CPI graphs for the same program 
when using different intervals. 
(a) (b) (c)  
Fig. 6. Average CPI graphs for the same program with different intervals. (a) interval set to 1,000. (b) interval set to 5,000. (c) interval set to 20,000. 
 
As can be seen from Fig. 6, while using different intervals, 
the average CPI graphs for the same program are significantly 
different. Generally, more details of the program’s behaviour 
can be obtained if less interval value is used, for example, those 
branch jump points are not present in Fig. 6 (b) and (c) but can 
be detected in Fig. 6 (a). According to this property, we could 
explore the sizes of the intervals to obtain the best suitable 
value for a specific program. Once a fixed interval is found, the 
feature extraction for the ICmetrics system would benefit from 
the balance of the system accuracy and performance. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The ICmetrics technology can automatically extract and 
analyse the features derived from an embedded system, and use 
these features to generate unique basic number for the purpose 
of encryption. The embedded system could benefit from it by 
automatically detecting frauds and protecting data 
communication during the system run time. 
PC alone is not enough to segment the individual phases of 
a program in execution. The peaks extracted from the CPI 
maps directly into the PC profile, which identifies a particular 
phase within a program. The phase is an interval within a 
program that has similar behaviour. By analysing similar 
phases, a unique basic number can be generated and 
subsequently used as encryption key in the ICmetrics security 
system. If an automated approach can be developed capable of 
identifying these phases, it would make it possible to extract 
information about how a program is changing in a way that 
could generalise to all embedded systems. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT  
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the UK 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council under 
grant EP/K004638/1 and the EU Interreg IV A 2 Mers Seas 
Zeeën Cross-border Cooperation Programme  –  SYSIASS 
project: Autonomous and Intelligent Healthcare System 
(project’s website http://www.sysiass.eu/). 
REFERENCES 
[1] Y. Kovalchuk, K. D. McDonald-Maier, and G. Howells, "Overview of 
ICmetrics technology-security infrastructure for autonomous and 
intelligent healthcare system," International Journal of u- and e- Sevice, 
Science and Technology, vol. 4, pp. 49-60, 2011. 
[2] M.Rahmatian, H. Kooti, I. G. Harris, and E. Bozorgzadeh, "Hardware 
Assisted Detection of Malicious Software in Embedded Systems," IEEE 
Embedded Systems Letters, vol. 4, pp. 94-97, 2012. 
[3] G. E. Suh and S. Devadas, "Physical Unclonable Functions for Device 
Authentication and Secret Key Generation," in 44th ACM/IEEE Design 
Automation Conference, 2007, pp. 9-14. 
[4] H. Handschuh, G.-J. Schrijen, and P. Tuyls, "Hardware Intrinsic 
Security from Physically Unclonable Functions," in Towards Hardware-
Intrinsic Security, A.-R. Sadeghi and D. Naccache, Eds., ed: Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 39-53. 
[5] A. K. Jain, P. Flynn, and A. Ross, Handbook of Biometrics: Springer 
US, 2008. 
[6] W. Sheng, G. Howells, M. C. Fairhurst, F. Deravi, and K. Harmer, 
"Consensus Fingerprint Matching with Genetically Optimised 
Approach," Pattern Recognition, vol. 42, pp. 1399-1407, 2009. 
[7] Y. Kovalchuk, W. G. J. Howells, H. Hu, D. Gu, and K. D. McDonald-
Maier, "A practical proposal for ensuring the provenance of hardware 
devices and their safe operation," in 7th IET International Conference on 
System Safety, incorporating the Cyber Security Conference, 2012, pp. 
1-6. 
[8] Y. Kovalchuk, W. G. J. Howells, H. Hu, D. Gu, and K. D. McDonald-
Maier, "ICmetrics for low resource embedded systems," in the 3rd 
International Conference on Emerging Security Technologies, 2012, pp. 
121 - 126. 
[9] Y. Kovalchuk, H. Huosheng, G. Dongbing, K. McDonald-Maier, D. 
Newman, S. Kelly, et al., "Investigation of Properties of ICmetrics 
Features," in the 3rd International Conference on Emerging Security 
Technologies (EST) 2012, pp. 115-120. 
[10] S. P. Reiss and M. Renieris, "Encoding program executions," in the 23rd 
International Conference on Software Engineering, 2001, pp. 221-230. 
[11] C. Gniady, A. R. Butt, and Y. C. Hu, "Program-counter-based pattern 
classification in buffer caching," in the 6th conference on Symposium on 
Opearting Systems Design & Implementation, 2004, pp. 27. 
[12] K. Hwang and N. Jotwani, Advanced Computer Architecture: Tata 
McGraw-Hill Education, 2010. 
[13] M. Annavaram, R. Rakvic, M. Polito, J. Bouguet, R. Hankins, and B. 
Davies, "The fuzzy correlation between code and performance 
predictability," in the 37th International Symposium on 
Microarchitecture (MICRO), 2004, pp. 93-104. 
  
